

Примеры количественных международных исследований

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- Есть ли отличия во внешней политике парламентских республик с многопартийными коалициями по сравнению с однопартийными правительствами?
- Чем объясняются эти отличия?

Гипотеза: государства с многопартийными коалициями склонны к более радикальному поведению по сравнению с однопартийными правительствами.

TABLE 2. Countries and Cabinet Types, 1966–1989

<i>Actor</i>	<i>Number of Events with Single-party Cabinets</i>	<i>Number of Events with Coalition Cabinets</i>	<i>Total</i>
Australia	281	286	567
Austria	192	48	240
Belgium	0	289	289
Canada	1,158	0	1,158
Denmark	93	73	166
West Germany	14	2,907	2,921
Greece	547	0	547
Iceland	0	137	137
India	1,759	0	1,759
Ireland	176	109	285
Israel	0	6,526	6,526
Italy	105	799	904
Japan	1,674	171	1,845
Luxembourg	0	38	38
Netherlands	0	317	317
New Zealand	271	0	271
Norway	101	104	205
Spain	256	0	256
Sweden	326	45	371
Turkey	332	408	740
United Kingdom	3,896	0	3,896
Total	11,181 (48%)	12,257 (52%)	23,438

Зависимые (объясняемые) переменные

- Cooperation/conflict – сотрудничество/конфликт [-10;+10]
- Extremity – радикальность проводимой политики [0;10].

World Event/Interaction Survey + Goldstein scale

-10.0 223	Military attack; clash; assault	-3.8 194	Halt negotiation	1.9 066	Release and/or return persons or property
-9.2 211	Seize position or possessions	-3.4 122	Denounce; denigrate; abuse	2.0 013	Admit wrongdoing; apologize, retract statement
-8.7 222	Nonmilitary destruction/injury	-3.0 160	Give warning	2.5 062	Give state invitation
-8.3 221	Noninjury destructive action	-2.4 132	Issue formal complaint or protest	2.8 054	Assure; reassure
-7.6 182	Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup	-2.2 121	Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove	2.8 033	Receive visit; host
-7.0 195	Break diplomatic relations	-2.2 191	Cancel or postpone planned event	2.9 065	Suspend sanctions; end punishment; call truce
-7.0 173	Threat with force specified	-1.9 131	Make complaint (not formal)	3.0 082	Agree to future action or procedure, to meet or to negotiate
-6.9 174	Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit	-1.1 063	Grant asylum	3.4 092	Ask for policy assistance
-5.8 172	Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction	-1.1 142	Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position	3.4 093	Ask for material assistance
-5.6 193	Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive	-0.9 141	Deny an accusation	3.4 041	Praise, hail, applaud, extend condolences
-5.2 181	Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on	-0.2 023	Comment on situation	3.6 042	Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal support
-5.0 201	Order person or personnel out of country	-0.1 102	Urge or suggest action or policy	4.5 053	Promise other future support
-4.9 202	Expel organization or group	-0.1 021	Explicit decline to comment	4.5 051	Promise own policy support
-4.9 150	Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance	-0.1 094	Request action; call for	5.2 052	Promise material support
-4.4 171	Threat without specific negative sanction stated	0.0 025	Explain or state policy; state future position	5.4 064	Grant privilege; diplomatic recognition; de facto relations
-4.4 212	Detain or arrest person(s)	0.1 091	Ask for information	6.5 073	Give other assistance
-4.1 192	Reduce routine international activity; recall officials	0.6 011	Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest	6.5 081	Make substantive agreement
-4.0 112	Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow	0.6 012	Yield position; retreat; evacuate	7.4 071	Extend economic aid; give, buy, sell, loan, borrow
-4.0 111	Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat	1.0 031	Meet with; send note	8.3 072	Extend military assistance
		1.2 095	Entreat; plead; appeal to; beg		
		1.5 101	Offer proposal		
		1.8 061	Express regret; apologize		
		1.9 032	Visit; go to		

Регрессоры (независимые переменные)

- Critical junior party – наличие критически влиятельных младших партнеров (dummy);
- Parliamentary strength – сила парламентской коалиции;
- Majority government – наличие правительства большинства (dummy);
- Number of coalition parties – количество участников коалиции.

Контрольные переменные

- Actor power – национальный потенциал (CINC);
- Democratic target – взаимодействие с демократическим режимом (Polity IV).

TABLE 3. Coalition Cabinet Characteristics and Foreign Policy Behavior

	<i>Cooperation/Conflict</i>	<i>Extremity</i>
Critical Junior Party	1.345 (.155)***	−0.395 (.081)***
Parliamentary Strength	2.557 (.440)***	−1.014 (.232)***
Majority Government	0.096 (.134)	0.002 (.072)
Number of Coalition Parties	−0.138 (.043)***	0.004 (.023)
Actor Power	56.432 (3.554)***	−23.943 (1.891)***
Democratic Target	0.533 (.080)***	—
(Constant)	−3.284 (.315)***	3.873 (.164)***
<i>N</i>	8,849	12,257

(Notes. Critical junior party is a dichotomous variable (1 = there was a critical party; 0 = none of the junior parties were critical). Majority government is a dichotomous variable (0 = minority government; 1 = majority government). The number of events for the cooperation/conflict analysis is lower due to the exclusion of events with nonstate actor targets. Reported here are the unstandardized coefficients from the regression analysis, with two-tailed tests (logit analysis for the commitment variable). Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$).

Основные результаты

- Коалиции с критически влиятельными младшими партнерами более склонны к сотрудничеству и проведению менее радикальной политики.
- Чем слабее коалиция, тем более конфликтна ее политика.
- Чем слабее коалиция, тем она более склонна к проведению радикальной политики.
- Разница в поведении между правительством большинства и меньшинства — незначительна.
- Коалиции с большим числом участвующих партий более склонны к конфликту.

TABLE 4. Weakness and Accountability and Foreign Policy Behavior (Coalitions and Single-party Cabinets)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Cooperation/Conflict				
Cabinet Type	0.153 (.060)**	0.173 (.060)***	−0.414 (.138)***	
Parliamentary Strength	−1.563 (.397)***	−4.33 (.566)***	−1.55 (.396)***	−1.389 (.396)***
Majority Government	0.125 (.092)	0.294 (.095)***	−0.126 (.107)	0.132 (.092)
Number of Parties				−0.002 (.026)
Strength × Cabinet Type		4.488 (.656)***		
Maj/Min × Cabinet Type			0.697 (.153)***	
Actor Power	20.276 (1.859)***	24.087 (1.938)***	21.554 (1.879)***	18.961 (1.845)***
Democratic Target	0.225 (.058)***	0.246 (.058)***	0.227 (.058)***	0.221 (.058)***
(Constant)	0.197 (.184)	1.491 (.263)***	0.359 (.187)*	0.187 (.185)
<i>N</i>	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059
Extremity				
Cabinet Type	0.101 (.032)***	0.091 (.032)***	0.306 (.073)***	
Parliamentary Strength	1.324 (.209)***	2.902 (.299)***	1.328 (.209)***	1.322 (.209)***
Majority Government	−0.088 (.049)*	−0.191 (.051)***	0.001 (.057)	−0.082 (.049)*
Number of Parties				0.049 (.014)***
Strength × Cabinet Type		−2.527 (.343)***		
Maj/Min × Cabinet Type			−0.255 (.082)***	
Actor Power	−4.945 (1.012)***	−7.069 (1.051)***	−5.484 (1.027)***	−4.967 (1.002)***
(Constant)	1.964 (.093)***	1.231 (.136)***	1.905 (.095)***	1.917 (.094)***
<i>N</i>	23,438	23,438	23,438	23,438

(Notes. The number of events for the cooperation/conflict analysis is lower due to the exclusion of events with non-state actor targets. Reported here are the unstandardized coefficients from the regression analysis (logit analysis for the commitment variable), with two-tailed tests. Cabinet type is coded 0 = single-party, 1 = coalition. Majority Government and Maj/Min Status are coded 0 = minority government, 1 = majority. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. The interactions were performed using mean-centered values to address potential collinearity. Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$).

Number of Parties and Conflict/Cooperation




FIG 1. Number of Parties and Conflict/Cooperation

Number of Parties and Extremity




FIG 2. Number of Parties and Extremity

Bertoli A. D. Nationalism and Conflict: Lessons from International Sports //International Studies Quarterly. – 2017.

- Повышает ли подъем национализма, связанный с участием в международных спортивных состязаниях, вероятность вооруженных межгосударственных конфликтов?

Table 2. Example of the final standings from a 1994 qualification round in Europe

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Qualified</i>
1	Italy	16	Yes
2	Switzerland	15	Yes
3	Portugal	14	No
4	Scotland	11	No
5	Malta	4	No
6	Estonia	1	No

Note. The sample consists of pairs of countries like Switzerland and Portugal that barely made and barely missed qualification.

Table 3. Countries That Barely Made and Barely Missed the World Cup

<i>Qualifier</i>	<i>Non-Qualifier</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Qualifier</i>	<i>Non-Qualifier</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Qualifier</i>	<i>Non-Qualifier</i>	<i>Year</i>
Yugoslavia	Romania	1958	Yugoslavia	Spain	1974	Czechoslovakia	Portugal	1990
France	Belgium	1958	East Germany	Romania	1974	United States	Trinidad	1990
Austria	Netherlands	1958	Poland	Britain	1974	UAE	Qatar	1990
Soviet Union	Poland	1958	Uruguay	Colombia	1974	Ireland	Denmark	1994
Hungary	Bulgaria	1958	Argentina	Paraguay	1974	Switzerland	Portugal	1994
Britain	Ireland	1958	Haiti	Trinidad	1974	Bulgaria	France	1994
Paraguay	Uruguay	1958	Italy	Britain	1978	Netherlands	Britain	1994
Argentina	Bolivia	1958	Austria	East Germany	1978	Bolivia	Uruguay	1994
Bulgaria	France	1962	France	Bulgaria	1978	Cameroon	Zimbabwe	1994
Switzerland	Sweden	1962	Poland	Portugal	1978	Nigeria	Ivory Coast	1994
Portugal	Czechoslovakia	1966	Sweden	Norway	1978	Morocco	Zambia	1994
Bulgaria	Belgium	1966	Spain	Romania	1978	South Korea	Japan	1994
West Germany	Sweden	1966	Tunisia	Egypt	1978	Nigeria	Guinea	1998
Chile	Ecuador	1966	France	Ireland	1982	Jamaica	Costa Rica	1998
Czechoslovakia	Hungary	1970	Austria	Bulgaria	1982	Chile	Peru	1998
Romania	Greece	1970	Britain	Romania	1982	Senegal	Morocco	2002
Bulgaria	Poland	1970	Peru	Uruguay	1982	Nigeria	Liberia	2002
Italy	East Germany	1970	El Salvador	Mexico	1982	Ivory Coast	Cameroon	2006
Sweden	France	1970	New Zealand	China	1982	Tunisia	Morocco	2006
Belgium	Yugoslavia	1970	Portugal	Sweden	1986	Togo	Senegal	2006
Peru	Bolivia	1970	Soviet Union	Switzerland	1986	Angola	Nigeria	2006
Morocco	Nigeria	1970	Bulgaria	East Germany	1986	Algeria	Egypt	2010
Sweden	Austria	1974	Romania	Denmark	1990	Nigeria	Tunisia	2010
Netherlands	Belgium	1974	Austria	Turkey	1990			




Figure 1. Balance between the qualifiers and nonqualifiers




Figure 2. Comparing aggression before and after the World Cup




Figure 3. Using smoothers to estimate the treatment effect