

Примеры количественных международных исследований

И.А. Истомин

Базы данных по отношениям между государствами

- Uppsala Conflict Database;
- Correlates of War;
- Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions;
- Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research;
- Vanhanen's index of democracy.



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DyadID	ConflictID	Location	SideA	Side B	SideBID	Incomp	Terr				
399	200	Bolivia	Government of Bolivia	Popular Revolutionary Movement	719	2					
400	200	Bolivia	Government of Bolivia	MNR	720	2					
401	200	Bolivia	Government of Bolivia	ELN	721	2					
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1946	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1947	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1948	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1949	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1950	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1951	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1952	1	1	
402	201	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of France	Khmer Issarak	160	1	Cambodia	1953	1	1	
403	202	China	Government of China	PLA	161	2		1946	2	3	
403	202	China	Government of China	PLA	161	2		1947	2	3	
403	202	China	Government of China	PLA	161	2		1948	2	3	
403	202	China	Government of China	PLA	161	2		1949	2	3	
404	203	Greece	Government of Greece	DSE	162	2		1946	2	3	
404	203	Greece	Government of Greece	DSE	162	2		1947	2	3	
404	203	Greece	Government of Greece	DSE	162	2		1948	2	3	
404	203	Greece	Government of Greece	DSE	162	2		1949	2	3	
405	204	Indonesia	Government of Netherlands	Indonesian People's Army	163	1	Indonesia	1946	1	1	
405	204	Indonesia	Government of Netherlands	Indonesian People's Army	163	1	Indonesia	1947	1	1	
405	204	Indonesia	Government of Netherlands	Indonesian People's Army	163	1	Indonesia	1948	1	1	
405	204	Indonesia	Government of Netherlands	Indonesian People's Army	163	1	Indonesia	1949	1	1	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1946	1	4	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1966	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1967	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1968	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1979	2	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1980	2	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1981	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1982	2	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1983	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1984	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1985	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1986	1	3	
406	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	164	1	Kurdistan	1987	1	3	



The Correlates of War Project

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News

[Correlates of War meeting at Peace Science 2017](#)

Oct 19, 2017

[Will Moore's Passing](#)

May 03, 2017

[State System Membership \(v2016\) now available.](#)

Feb 27, 2017

[Trade \(v4.0\) now available.](#)

Feb 20, 2017

[Colonial/Dependency Configuity v3.1 available](#)

Feb 17, 2017

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About the Correlates of War Project

Welcome to the Correlates of War (COW) project homepage. COW seeks to facilitate the collection, dissemination, and use of accurate and reliable quantitative data in international relations. Key principles of the project include a commitment to standard scientific principles of replication, data reliability, documentation, review, and the transparency of data collection procedures. More specifically, we are committed to the free public release of data sets to the research community, to release data in a timely manner after data collection is completed, to provide

- COW Country Codes;
- COW Wars (Inter; Intra; Non; Extra);
- Militarized Interstate Disputes v4.1 (1816-2010);
- Formal Alliance v4.1 (1816-2012).

National Material Capabilities

COW

- общая численность населения;
- численность городского населения;
- потребление первичной энергии;
- выплавка чугуна и стали;
- военные расходы
- численность персонала вооруженных сил

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Receive ATOP Updates

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Mailing List Information

Project Description and Coding Rules

The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project provides data regarding the content of military alliance agreements signed by all countries of the world between 1815 and 2003. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the [National Science Foundation](#) (grant SES-0095983). We define our terms and explain the process through which the data were collected and coded in the ATOP codebook, available for download [here](#).

From this website, you can use our search engine to find the alliances of interest to you and view a codesheet describing each alliance (usually with direct quotations from the primary text). The codesheets also provide citations to the full text of the agreements. You can also download numeric datasets useful for statistical analysis. Finally, we provide citations to some of the published research that has been accomplished using the ATOP data.

Before proceeding, we encourage users to review the documentation explaining the ATOP project and data. You will find links to download this information to your right.

Downloads:

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Обязательства

- DEFENSE – активная военная помощь в случае нападения;
- OFFENSE – активная военная помощь;
- NEUTRAL – нейтралитет в случае нападения;
- NONAGG – ненападение;
- CONSUL – консультации в случае кризиса;
- ACTIVE – DEFENSE+OFFENSE;

Условия исполнения обязательств (CONDITIO)

АТОР

- DEFCON – обусловленность военной помощи в случае нападения;
 - DEFCONADV – обязательства в отношении конкретного противника (или типа противников);
 - DEFCONLOC – обязательства в отношении конкретной территории;
 - DEFCONCON – обязательства в отношении конкретного текущего конфликта;
 - DEFCONUM – обязательства в отношении некоторого числа противников;
 - DEFCONDEM – обусловленность обязательств дополнительными требованиями к союзнику или противнику;
 - DEFCONPR – обязательства в случае отсутствия провокации;
- OFFCON – обусловленность военной помощи;
- NEUCON – обусловленность нейтралитета;
- CONCON – обусловленность консультаций.

- Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2016;
- High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 1989-2017\$
- Memberships in Conventional Intergovernmental Organizations (CIO), 1952-1997;
- Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2016;
- State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016.

Florea, A. (2017). De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011). *International Studies Quarterly*

- Почему одни «де факто» государства сохраняются, а другие исчезают?
- Что определяет судьбу тех, которые исчезают? В каком случае они становятся жертвами насильственного присоединения, мирной реинтеграции или приобретают полное признание?

Что такое «де-факто» государство?

1. belongs to (or is administered by) a recognized country, but is not a colonial possession;
2. seeks some degree of separation from that country and has declared independence;
3. exerts military control over a territory or portions of territory inhabited by a permanent population;
4. is not sanctioned by the government;
5. performs at least basic governance functions, such as provision of social and political order;
6. lacks international legal sovereignty;
7. exists for at least 24 months.

Какие случаи можно отнести к «де факто» государствам?

- кейс-стади (Bahcheli et al. 2004; Caspersen 2012; Caspersen and Stanseld 2011; Geldenhuys 2009; Lynch 2004; O'Loughlin et al. 2011; Pegg 1998; Seymour 2008);
- предыдущие количественные исследования (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Sorens 2012; Graham and Horne 2012);
- список движений борющихся за самоопределение в базе данных Minorities at Risk;
- дополнительные базы данных (UCDP/PRIО nonstate actor data; Uppsala Conflict Database; Sambanis's (2004) civil war coding notes; Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset; Federation of American Scientists (FAS) list of Liberation Movements, Terrorist Organizations, Substance Cartels, and Other Para-State Entities; Keesing's World News Archives; Lexis Nexis; Library of Congress country studies; Encyclopedia Britannica);
- интервью специалистов-регионоведов.

Table 1. Population of de facto states (1945–2011)

<i>De facto state</i>	<i>Parent state</i>	<i>Emergence</i>	<i>Disappearance</i>	<i>Type of disappearance</i>
<i>Katanga</i>	Congo (DRC)	1960	1963	forceful reintegration
<i>Biafra</i>	Nigeria	1967	1970	forceful reintegration
<i>Krajina</i>	Croatia	1991	1995	forceful reintegration
<i>Chechnya</i>	Russia	1991	1999	forceful reintegration
<i>Anjouan</i>	Comoros	1997	2008	forceful reintegration
<i>Tamil Eelam</i>	Sri Lanka	1984	2009	forceful reintegration
<i>Rwenzururu Kingdom</i>	Uganda	1963	1982	peaceful reintegration
<i>Găgăuzia</i>	Moldova	1991	1995	peaceful reintegration
<i>Bougainville</i>	Papua New Guinea	1975	1997	peaceful reintegration
<i>Eastern Slavonia</i>	Croatia	1995	1998	peaceful reintegration
<i>Ajaria</i>	Georgia	1991	2004	peaceful reintegration
<i>Aceh</i>	Indonesia	2001	2005	peaceful reintegration
<i>Karen State</i>	Burma	1949	—	alive
<i>Kachin State</i>	Burma	1961	—	alive
<i>Taiwan</i>	China	1971	—	alive
<i>Mindanao</i>	Philippines	1973	—	alive
<i>TRNC^a</i>	Cyprus	1974	—	alive
<i>Western Sahara</i>	Morocco ^b	1974	—	alive
<i>Cabinda</i>	Angola	1975	—	alive
<i>Casamance</i>	Senegal	1982	—	alive
<i>Abkhazia</i>	Georgia	1991	—	alive
<i>Kurdistan</i>	Iraq	1991	—	alive
<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Azerbaijan	1991	—	alive
<i>Puntland</i>	Somalia	1991	—	alive
<i>Somaliland</i>	Somalia	1991	—	alive
<i>South Ossetia</i>	Georgia	1991	—	alive
<i>Transnistria</i>	Moldova	1991	—	alive
<i>Republika Srpska</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	—	alive
<i>Palestine</i>	Israel ^c	1995	—	alive
<i>Gaza</i>	Palestine ^d	2007	—	alive
<i>Eritrea</i>	Ethiopia	1964	1993	statehood
<i>East Timor</i>	Indonesia	1975	2002	statehood
<i>Kosovo^e</i>	Serbia	1998	2008	statehood
<i>South Sudan</i>	Sudan	1956	2011	statehood

^aTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, ^bAdministered by Morocco, ^cUnder Israeli occupation, ^dUnder Hamas control, ^eNot a UN member.

ОСНОВНЫЕ ГИПОТЕЗЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ

H1: *The greater the extent of external military support for the separatists, the lower the likelihood of de facto state reintegration (peaceful or forceful) or transition to statehood.*

H2: *The greater the degree of state building in the de facto state, the lower the likelihood of reintegration (forceful or peaceful) and the higher the likelihood of transition to statehood.*

H3: *The greater the level of fragmentation in the de facto state, the higher the likelihood of forceful reintegration, and the lower the likelihood of peaceful reintegration or transition to statehood.*

H4: *The higher the number of government veto players, the lower the likelihood of reintegration (forceful or peaceful), or transition to statehood.*

V.1 Типы внешней военной поддержки

1. weaponry and military hardware;

2. foreign military personnel;

3. foreign military advisors;

4. training for de facto state troops abroad;

5. safe havens.

- среднее (mean): 2.78;
- медиана: 3.

V.2 Уровень развития государственности

1. an executive;
2. a legislature and/or regional councils;
3. a court or semi-formalized legal system;
4. a civilian tax system;
5. an educational system;
6. a welfare system;
7. institutions for foreign affairs;
8. a media or propaganda system;
9. a police and/or gendarmerie system;
10. a central banking system.

V.3 Фрагментация внутри «де факто» государства

A faction is an organization that claims to represent the population of the de facto state and makes demands regarding the status of the enclave, such as reintegration into the parent state, limited autonomy, broad autonomy, no change in status, independence, (re)union with another state, or membership in a supra-national entity.

A faction can be a political *party*, *military organization*, or *civic group* that operates within or outside the de facto state.

V.3; V.4 Фрагментация и число вето-игроков

- A faction is an organization that claims to represent the population of the de facto state and makes demands regarding the status of the enclave, such as reintegration into the parent state, limited autonomy, broad autonomy, no change in status, independence, (re)union with another state, or membership in a supra-national entity. A faction can be a political party, military organization, or civic group that operates within or outside the de facto state.
- executive constrains (Polity IV).

Контрольные переменные

- предшествующий статус (Prior status);
- колониальное наследие (Colony);
- наличие миротворцев (Peacekeepers);
- признание (recognition).

Table 2. De facto state outcomes

	(1) Forceful reintegration	(2) Peaceful reintegration	(3) Statehood
Prior status	1.234 (1.103)	0.515 (0.639)	
Colony	0.860 (1.250)	0.243 (0.316)	
Peacekeepers	3.072 (4.477)	7.125 (11.328)	7.430** (6.653)
Recognition	0.998** (0.001)		
Military support	0.995 (0.003)	0.990* (0.005)	0.986*** (0.003)
State building	0.997 (0.002)	0.997** (0.001)	1.015*** (0.005)
Fragmentation	1.003 (0.002)	0.986** (0.006)	1.002*** (0.001)
Veto players	1.001 (0.002)	1.005** (0.002)	0.993*** (0.002)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	4
N	780	780	780

Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table 3. Percentage change (per year) in the hazard of each de facto state outcome

<i>Recognition</i>	<i>Military support</i>	<i>State building</i>	<i>Fragmentation</i>	<i>Veto players</i>	<i>De facto state outcome</i>
−0.2%	insig.	insig.	insig.	insig.	<i>Forceful reintegration</i>
n.e.	−1.0%	−0.3%	−1.4%	+0.5%	<i>Peaceful reintegration</i>
n.e.	−1.4%	+1.5%	+0.2%	−0.7%	<i>Statehood</i>

Results significant at the .10 level or above. insig. = effect is statistically insignificant. n.e. = not estimated (outcome perfectly predicted or insufficient variation).

Статьи с количественными методами анализа
в журнале Вестник МГИМО- Университета за 2014 г.

Номер	Кол-во статей с применением количественных методов анализа	Общее кол-во статей (не считая рецензий)
№1	1 [Темницкий 2014]	50
№2	1 [Артамоновы 2014]	53
№3	1 [Завьялов 2014]	43
№4	0	41
№5	Специальный выпуск, посвященный 70-летию МГИМО (статьи только о научных школах МГИМО)	
№6	1 [Щепелева 2014]	33

Таблица 5а

Статьи с количественными методами анализа
в журнале «Мировая экономика и международные
отношения» за 2014 г.

Номер	Кол-во статей с применением количественных методов анализа	Общее кол-во статей (не считая рецензий)
№1	0	8
№2	0	9
№3	1 [Хохлов 2014]	9
№4	1 [Дегтерев 2014]	10
№5	0	11
№6	0	12
№7	0	11
№8	1 [Корженевский 2014]	11
№9	1 [Алексеев 2014]	11
№10	0	12
№11	0	14
№12	1 [Лукашин, Рахлина 2014]	11

Таблица 5в

Статьи с количественными методами анализа
в журнале Вестник международных организаций
за 2014 г.

Номер	Кол-во статей с применением количественных методов анализа	Общее кол-во статей (не считая рецензий и слова редактора)
№1	3 [Андерсен и др. 2014; Диденко 2014; Лазутина 2014]	10
№2	3 [Нагорнов 2014; Владимирова и др. 2014; Лазутина и др. 2014]	12
№3	0	8
№4	3 [Кокотсис 2014; Киртон и др. 2014; Ларионова и др. 2014]	9


Таблица 5г

Статьи с количественными методами анализа в
журнале Полис за 2014 г.

Номер	Кол-во статей с применением количественных методов анализа	Общее кол-во статей (не считая рецензий и слова редактора)
№1	1 [Нисневич, Рожич 2014]	12
№2	0	11
№3	0	11
№4	0	10
№5	1 [Локшин 2014]	14
№6	2 [Ахременко 2014; Бузин 2014]	13

Рисунок 1

Применяемая методология анализа международных отношений в ведущих мировых научных журналах



Источник: *Models, Numbers, and Cases 2004: 5-7.*

Ведущие зарубежные журналы

- International Organization (3);
- *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (7);
- *Journal of Peace Research* (8);
- International Studies Quarterly (9);
- *Conflict Management and Peace Studies* (17).